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Abstract 
In recent years, there has been a steady growth in the use of information systems in the logistics domain towards facilitating an 
agile distribution process. This study investigates the problem of collaboration planning in logistics and proposes an agent-based 
approach for better management of collaborative logistics.  Based on the approach, a decision support system is designed that 
utilizes RFID technology for ensuring inventory accuracy. 
The proposed approach involves three steps. In the first step, a conceptual agent based model is designed. In the second step, 
the game theory method is utilized to intensively study and analyze suppliers’ collaboration and carriers’ collaboration that 
represent major objectives proposed in the preceding model. Finally, correctness of the games is verified by formulating them 
mathematically. Developed optimization equations are fundamental to the operation research field. They employ the simplex and 
goal algorithms of linear programming. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Citizens’ demands are increasing and accordingly, there is a considerable load on developing efficient distributive 
logistics. This accentuates the need to develop an optimized approach for handling and managing freights’ distribution 
to eliminate any existing problems. Supply chain management is usually performed in collaboration between various 
logistical entities. The collaboration especially in the transportation field is happening by exchanging commodities 
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and sharing vehicles’ weights (Bailey et al., 2011).  
The collaboration requires rapid and effective technique. Agent technique is recommended because it 
provides velocity and accuracy in performing the work. Accordingly, implementing an agent based model will speed 
up the supply chain process, make it just-in-time, just-in-request, more accurate, and efficient. 
Major addressed problem is the unorganized distribution of freight, which creates lots of negative 
consequences such as the LTL problem. This problem results in crowding of the city roads and air pollution, which in 
turn affects citizens’ health negatively. Hernández et al. (2011) claim that LTL idle weights in transporting vehicles. 
Another considerable problem is the unorganized communication between various logistical entities, which causes 
deficiency in satisfying customers' requests. Thus, it is significant to investigate the reasons behind these and other 
problems and solve them, which is the goal of this study. 
 
2. Conceptual Agent-based Model 
 
The designed model as illustrated in Figure 1, includes six autonomous agents interacting properly with each other 
as well as with the surrounding environment. To achieve the overall goal of the model, each agent has a major role to 
play. Following is an explanation of each agent in the proposed intelligent decision support system:  
x The RFIDG Agent: The agent major role is to receive data from the RFID reader and places them into the 
merchandise database after filtering to ensure their accuracy. Moreover, the agent removes duplicate scanned 
records and displays alert messages in case of sensing exotic behaviors. Such as scanning a product that has been 
placed in the wrong area. Since scanning products involve human intervention, then there are chances for errors. 
Thus, the agent’s major role becomes significant. Besides its major role, the RFIDG agent holds all products 
unfiltered information. Then, whenever any supplier inquires about any particular information of a specific product 
that is not entered into the filtered accurate database, the supplier will contact the RFIDG agent to get that particular 
detail. 
x The Retailer Agent: When a human retailer logs into the system to request a shipment; the retailer agent notifies 
both the supplier agent and the carrier agent. It notifies the supplier agent to allow it to search in its database about 
the requested freight. While, notifying the carrier agent to enable it to check in its records for arranged shipments 
with LTL that will pass nearby the retailer’s saved location in the system, it also recommends lower cost delivery 
of shipments to that retailer in a specific date, which will eliminate the LTL problem. 
x The Supplier Agent: Once the retailer agent informs the supplier agent about a new retailer’s request; the supplier 
agent starts searching inside its database about the requested product and then, replies back to the retailer about 
the status of the request as either available or not. It also recommends another availability date of the needed 
product or another available amount if different from retailer’s request. In case the retailer requests unavailable 
commodity or more than the available amount in supplier’s depot, the supplier agent will search other suppliers in 
the system who have enough amount of the requested commodity with reasonable price and high quality, and will 
recommend to the original supplier to collaborate with them. Suppliers’ collaboration allows satisfying customers’ 
needs. Note that for each specific supplier, the agent keeps record of the most collaborated suppliers. Thus, it 
recommends them first at later times for that specific supplier, which makes the supplier agent an intelligent agent. 
In addition, the supplier agent rate suppliers’ performance, which is based on many criteria such as availabilities 
of their products, qualities, prices, and coping situation with other suppliers. In the recommendation list of 
suppliers to collaborate with, suppliers with higher rates get listed after the most collaborated suppliers.   
x The Carrier Agent: In case the shipment request is confirmed by the retailer then, the supplier agent informs the 
carrier agent that there is a shipment delivery request. Therefore, the carrier agent will search inside its database 
for an available vehicle in the required date and with adequate weight to assign it to the delivery order. Afterwards, 
the carriers’ database will be updated automatically and a confirmation number is generated and sent through the 
agent to both the supplier and the retailer. Moreover, once a retailer logs-in to the system, the carrier agent gets 
notified by the retailer agent that she needs a freight delivery. Hence, the carrier agent looks for arranged delivery 
vehicles with LTL that will pass nearby that retailer’s location to offer lower cost shipments to that retailer enabling 
him to allocate the available empty weight in the shipping vehicle. The carrier agent rates carriers’ performance, 
which is based on their efficiency in delivering freights to right retailers and within expected times. For instance, 
the carrier agent weights a carrier high if he always delivers on time and lowers his rate if he has late deliveries 
for few times. 
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x The Network Agent: This agent is responsible about measuring congestion on delivery routes and informing the 
city administrator agent about existing severe congestion. In addition, it assigns the supplier’s location as an origin 
point and the retailer’s location as a destination point to calculate the shortest delivery path between them and 
sends it to the carrier to enable him to deliver freights on time.  Afterwards, the agent scans the shortest delivery 
route looking for neighboring retailers to the original one who initiated the freight’s delivery order and sends the 
list to the carrier agent. This enables the carrier agent to send lower cost delivery offers to the retailers on the 
neighboring list if the freight’s order is causing LTL problem. The agent saves shortest paths with their neighboring 
retailers list to be able to recall them faster on future shipments. 
x The City Administrator Agent: Once the carrier agent informs the city administrator agent about arranged freight 
delivery order, the agent announces the delivery rules of the city where the shipment is arranged, to both the carrier 
and the supplier. Announcing cities’ delivery rules enable suppliers and carriers to obey with the rules. In case of 
rules violation, the city administrator agent recommends other alternative solutions to them. One solution can be 
dividing the shipment on two smaller vehicles instead of the large prohibited vehicle’s size. Another solution can 
be changing delivery time to be within allowed times. The city administrator agent should provide the carrier with 
the second shortest delivery route in case of receiving severe congestion alerts from the network agent. In case, 
the carrier cannot go through the second shortest delivery route, then the agent should be able to take other 
decisions. Another solution can be dispatching shipment to another retailer than the planned one in case of 
delivering to more than one retailer. Successful decisions will be stored in agent's history to be used in future 
similar situations. Thus, the agent is considered intelligent because it uses its knowledge and historical information 
to recommend best decisions. 
 
 
Fig.1. Designed conceptual multi-agent based model 
3. Game Theory for Suppliers in Coalition  
 
This game represents suppliers’ collaboration toward maximizing profits, and at the same time satisfying retailers’ 
needs. The game is a sequential-move game in which players take turns. Therefore, buyers play first to place 
purchasing orders and afterwards, sellers take turn to evaluate buyers’ decisions and respond to them accordingly. 
Although, the game is a multistage (dynamic) game; it also has simultaneous-moves of players at the time that each 
set of players take turn. This occurs when all of the buyers request purchases from sellers at the same time without 
knowing that other buyers are also requesting the same seller for the same product. The game attains the “Nash 
328   Manal Khayyat and Anjali Awasthi /  Transportation Research Procedia  12 ( 2016 )  325 – 338 
Equilibrium” solution concept since it intends to profit all players entering the game and since suppliers cannot achieve 
better profits by switching strategies.  
 
Players 
ܵ௫: The set of all suppliers entering the game as sellers, for x א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݊ሽ.  
ܤ௬: The set of all suppliers entering the game as buyers, for y א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡ݉ሽ. 
 
Notions 
ܵܥ௫: Seller’s cost price, ܵܵ௫: Seller’s selling price, ܵ ௫ܲ: Seller’s total profits.  
ܤܥ௬: Buyer’s cost price, ܤܵ௬: Buyer’s selling price, ܤ ௬ܲ: Buyer’s profits. 
 
Strategies 
 
Some of the rules were common between all players as following:  
x All suppliers concern with making higher profits, which represent the payoff in this game 
x Suppliers enter the game as either seller or buyer but, once a supplier enters; he is not allowed to change status 
 
Beside the common strategies between both of the sellers and buyers, each one of them has his own defined rules. For 
example sellers follow below strategies: 
1. Aim to sell higher quantity of their products 
2. Prefer to sell with the assigned selling price not lower 
3. If a seller found out that two buyers or more causing him the same profits then, he will sell to the buyer with the 
lowest id assuming that s\he entered the game earlier and thus, got the higher priority.  
 
On the other hand, buyers follow below sequential strategies: 
1. Buy products with higher quality 
2. Buy from sellers who offer selling prices that are less than both of the buyer’s cost price and selling price i.e. 
ܵܵ௫ ൏ ܤܥ௬Ƭܵܵ௫ ൏ ܤܵ௬. Set this situation as “Higher Profits” 
3. Buy from sellers who offer selling prices that are equal the buyer’s cost price but, less than buyer’s selling price 
i.e. ܵܵ௫ ൌ ܤܥ௬Ƭܵܵ௫ ൏ ܤܵ௬. Set this situation as “Same Profits” 
4. Buy from sellers who offer selling prices that are greater than the buyer’s cost price but, less than buyer’s selling 
price i.e. ܵܵ௫ ൐ ܤܥ௬Ƭܵܵ௫ ൏ ܤܵ௬. Set this situation as “Lower Profits” 
5. Buy from sellers who offer selling prices that are equal the buyer’s selling price for the aim of satisfying 
consumer’s order (not for increasing supplier’s profit) i.e. ܵܵ௫ ൌ ܤܵ௬. Set this situation as “Break Even”. Break 
even points occur when the profits equal zero.  
6. Do not buy from sellers who offer selling prices that are greater than the buyer’s selling price i.e. ܵܵ௫ ൐ ܤܵ௬. 
Set this situation as “Loss”.  
 
3.1. Game Theoretic Scenario 
 
Assume that five sellers and three buyers entered the game as illustrated in Table 1.   
 
Table 1. Suppliers entered the game (input table) 
Seller ID Product Availability Date Quantity Quality Cost Price Selling Price 
ଵܵ Rice 02-April-2014 900 Kg High $20/ Kg $24/ Kg 
ܵଶ Rice 16-January-2014 3000 Kg Middle $15/ Kg $20/ Kg 
ܵଷ Rice 01-May-2014 2000 Kg Low $09/ Kg $17/ Kg 
ܵସ Rice 04-May-2014 500 Kg High $19/ Kg $20/ Kg 
ܵହ Rice 28-February-2014 1000 Kg High $19/ Kg $22/ Kg 
 Product Required Date Quantity Cost Price Selling Price Requirement 
ܤଵ Rice 01-August-2014 1800 Kg $18/ Kg $20/ Kg (Selling Price -1) 
ܤଶ Rice 30-May-2014 2000 Kg $20/ Kg $24/ Kg Same Selling Price 
ܤଷ Rice 06-June-2014 3500 Kg $20/ Kg $25/ Kg Same Selling Price 
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Looking to the first buyer, he needs 1800 Kg of rice. Thus, looking for sellers with “High” quality first. There is 
ଵܵǡ ܵସǡ and ܵହǤ The buyer decided to purchase all the 500 Kg of rice from ܵସ. This decision is made because ܵସhas 
the lowest selling price among other sellers that selling high quality products. The buyer still needs more 1300 Kg of 
rice. Considering that the other two sellers with high quality products will cause a loss to the buyer since their selling 
prices ($24 and $22) are higher than the buyer’s selling price ($20). Then, the buyer decided to buy the rest needed 
kilograms of rice from ܵଶǤ  Rest of the buyers will evaluate sellers same as the first buyer did. Therefore, the program 
will generate the first output Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Maximizing profits from buyers’ perspective (output table1) 
BuyerID SellerID Sellers Ordering Bought Quantity Quality Profits Status 
ܤଵ ଵܵ  0 Kg High $0 Loss 
ܤଵ ܵଶ 2 1300 Kg Middle $1300 Lower Profits  
ܤଵ ܵଷ  0 Kg Low $0 Higher Profits 
ܤଵ ܵସ 1 500 Kg High $500 Lower Profits 
ܤଵ ܵହ  0 Kg High $0 Loss 
ܤଶ ଵܵ 3 500 Kg High $0 Break Even 
ܤଶ ܵଶ  0 Kg Middle $0 Same Profits 
ܤଶ ܵଷ  0 Kg Low $0 Higher Profits 
ܤଶ ܵସ 1 500 Kg High $2000 Same Profits 
ܤଶ ܵହ 2 1000 Kg High $2000 Lower Profits 
ܤଷ ଵܵ 3 900 Kg High $900 Lower Profits 
ܤଷ ܵଶ 4 1100 Kg Middle $5500 Same Profits 
ܤଷ ܵଷ  0 Kg Low $0 Higher Profits 
ܤଷ ܵସ 1 500 Kg High $2500 Same Profits 
ܤଷ ܵହ 2 1000 Kg High $3000 Lower Profits 
 
Note that, the “Sellers Ordering” filed in above table indicates the best order of sellers from the buyers’ point of 
view in regard to making higher profits while buying best quality in market. 
Following is the first version of buyers’ decisions about recommended sellers to collaborate with.  
ܤଵ ՜ܵସǡ ܵଶ  
ܤଶ ՜ܵସǡ ܵହǡ ଵܵ 
ܤଷ ՜ܵସǡ ܵହǡ ଵܵǡ ܵଶ 
 
After buyers have sent purchasing requests to sellers; each seller will evaluate all buyers, paying more attention to 
the ones that already sent him purchasing request. Sellers will assign sequential numbers to buyers starting by one and 
moving up. Note that one means the buyer with the best assessment in regards to purchasing the highest amount and/or 
making the highest profits. The buyers ordering is demonstrated in the “Buyers Ordering” field of Table 3. The first 
seller received two purchasing orders from ܤଶ  and ܤଷ . Therefore, the seller calculated the profits achieved from 
collaborating with each one of the buyers. It is found that ܤଷ will maximize the seller’s profits sinceܤଷ ordered all of 
the available kilograms of rice with ଵܵǤ Hence, the seller decided to collaborate fully and sell to ܤଷ. 
The rest of the sellers will evaluate buyers same as the first one did. Note that, the third seller has a low quality 
product and thus, no buyer asked him for a purchase. However, because this game satisfies the “Nash Equilibrium” 
solution concept; where no player supposed to lose, then by the end of the game the third seller founds that both of ܤଶ 
and ܤଷ still needs more kilograms of rice. While, all other sellers have sold out their quantities. Therefore, the seller 
offered his available kilograms of rice to both of the buyers. Hence, the program will generate the second output Table 
3, which represents maximizing profits from sellers’ perspective. 
 
Table 3. Maximizing profits from sellers’ perspective (output table2) 
Seller ID Buyer ID Buyers Ordering Sold Quantity Profits Buyer’s Requirement 
ଵܵ ܤଵ  0 Kg $0 (Selling Price -1) 
ଵܵ ܤଶ 2 500 Kg $2000 Same Selling Price 
ଵܵ ܤଷ 1 900 Kg $3600 Same Selling Price 
ܵଶ ܤଵ 2 1300 Kg $5200 (Selling Price -1) 
ܵଶ ܤଶ  0 Kg $0 Same Selling Price 
ܵଶ ܤଷ 1 1100 Kg $5500 Same Selling Price 
ܵଷ ܤଵ  0 Kg $0 (Selling Price -1) 
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ܵଷ ܤଶ  0 Kg $0 Same Selling Price 
ܵଷ ܤଷ  0 Kg $0 Same Selling Price 
ܵସ ܤଵ  500 Kg $0 (Selling Price -1) 
ܵସ ܤଶ 1 500 Kg $500 Same Selling Price 
ܵସ ܤଷ 1 500 Kg $500 Same Selling Price 
ܵହ ܤଵ  0 Kg $0 (Selling Price -1) 
ܵହ ܤଶ 1 1000 Kg $3000 Same Selling Price 
ܵହ ܤଷ 1 1000 Kg $3000 Same Selling Price 
 
Based on Table 3 and after sellers’ evaluation to buyers; sellers made their decisions about recommended buyers 
to collaborate with as following: 
 
 ଵܵ ՜ ܤଷ  
ܵଶ ՜ܤଵǡ ܤଷ 
ܵଷ ՜ܤଶǡ ܤଷ 
ܵସ ՜ ܤଶ  
ܵହ ՜ ܤଶ  
 
After that sellers confirmed their decisions, and assuming that buyers agreed on these collaboration decisions. 
Because it maximizes their profits, as well as, it satisfies their purchasing requests. We can now visualize the final 
version of buyers’ decisions about recommended sellers to collaborate with: 
 
ܤଵ ՜ܵଶ  
ܤଶ ՜ܵସǡ ܵହǡ ܵଷ 
ܤଷ ՜ ଵܵǡ ܵଶǡ ܵଷ 
 
Fig. 2. Suppliers’ collaboration chart 
 
Figure 2. Demonstrates the most recommended supplies to collaborate with. Noticing that, all entered players have 
collaborated either fully or partially and that there is no loser in this scenario. Thus, it fulfills the “Nash Equilibrium” 
solution concept.  
 
3.2. Mathematical Formulation 
 
This section formulates the main objective of the modeled game theory for suppliers in coalition mathematically. 
Considering the main objective, which is to maximize suppliers achieved profits then, a linear programming model 
that is solved using the simplex algorithm is developed.   
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Decision variable 
 
ܳ௫: Quantity supplied by the ݔ௧௛ supplier. ݔ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ሽǤ ܳ௫ is represented in kg.  
 
Parameters 
 
ܴ௫:  Requested quantity from the ݔ௧௛ supplier. 
ܣ௫:  Available quantity with the ݔ௧௛ supplier. 
ܲݏ௫: Selling price of the ݔ௧௛ supplier. 
ܲܿ௫: Cost price of the ݔ௧௛ supplier. 
௫ܲ:    Total profits achieved by the ݔ௧௛ supplier(s). 
 
Objective function 
 
The objective function concerns with maximizing suppliers’ profits through satisfying retailers’ purchasing orders. 
  
Max ௫ܲ ൌ σ ሺܲݏ௫ െܲܿ௫ሻ௡௫ୀଵ כ ܳ௫                                                                    (1) 
Subject to        
ܳ௫ ൑ ܣ௫  for ݔ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǥ ǡ ݊ሽ                                                                                                                                   (2)         
σ ܳ௫௡௫ୀଵ ൑ σ ܴ௫௡௫ୀଵ                                                                                                                                                    (3) 
ܳ௫ ൒ Ͳǡ  for  ݔ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ሽ                                                                                                                                   (4) 
        
Constraint (2) ensures that the supplier has enough quantity of the requested freights to be supplied. While, 
constraint (3) ensures that the total supplied quantity satisfied the retailer’s requested quantity of the freight. Finally, 
constraint (4) makes sure that there is a positive quantity of the freight to supply, for x א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ሽ  .  
 
Numerical example 
Assume that three suppliers in the market want to collaborate by sharing their available quantity of the products 
as illustrated in Table 4.  
 
Table 4. Details of three suppliers in coalition 
Suppliers (ݔ) Available Quantity (ܣ௫) Requested Quantity (ܴ௫) Cost Price (ܲܿ௫) Selling Price (ܲݏ௫) 
1 5000 1000 3 4 
2 7000 8000 5 7 
3 4800 5000 4 7 
 
Case (1): Coalition between supplier 1 and 2 
 
The problem is:  
Maximize ሺܲଵǡଶሻ = σ ሺܲݏ௫ െܲܿ௫ሻଶ௫ୀଵ כ ܳ௫ = ͳ כ ଵܳ ൅ ʹ כ ܳଶ                     
Subject to: 
ଵܳ ൑5000                                                                                                                                 
ܳଶ ൑7000                                                                                                                                 
ଵܳ ൅ ܳଶ ൑9000                                                                                                                       
ଵܳ ൒ 0, ܳଶ ൒0                                                                                                                         
 
Substituting values of given parameters and putting the problem in a free calculator for ଵ†, we get the following 
solution; the maximum ሺܲଵǡଶሻ = ͳ כ ʹͲͲͲ ൅ ʹ כ ͹ͲͲͲ = 16000$ 
The optimal value appeared at the point ෡ with the following co-ordinates (2000, 7000). The two resulted co-ordinates 
 
 
1
 http://www.zweigmedia.com/RealWorld/simplex.html 
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clarify the two needed quantities to supply. 
Rest of the cases will be calculated similar to the first case. Table 5 summarizes all the collaborative cases and 
types.  
 
 
Table 5. Numerical analysis for three suppliers in coalition 
Supplier  Available 
Quantity  
Requested 
Quantity  
Supplied 
Quantity  
Satisfy 
Customer? 
Cost Price  Selling 
Price  
Achieved 
Profits  
1 5000 1000 1000 Y 3 4 1000 
2 7000 8000 7000 N 5 7 14000 
3 4800 5000 4800 N 4 7 14400 
12 12000 9000 9000 Y   16000 
13 9800 6000 6000 Y   15600 
23 11800 13000 11800 N   28400 
123 16800 14000 14000 Y   30600 
 
We conclude from Table 5, that the grand full coalition between all the three suppliers in the market resulted in 
satisfying all the requested quantities of the freights. Moreover, each supplier was able to achieve higher profits than 
when working individually. Furthermore, the second and the third suppliers were not able to satisfy their customers’ 
orders when working separately. On the other hand, when they collaborated with the other supplier in the market, they 
were able to satisfy their customers’ requests.  
We notice significant increase in the achieved profits as a result of sharing products’ quantities in an efficient 
collaborative environment. Thereby, suppliers are highly recommended to work together and participate in coalition.   
 
4. Game Theory for Carriers in Coalition  
 
This game ensures successful collaboration among multiple carriers in the coalition. The game is a cooperative 
one time game because all players have the same interest, which is to deliver the requested quantities of the freights 
utilizing fully occupied shipping vehicles. Releasing fully occupied vehicles qualify the retailers to get minimized 
delivery costs, and at the same time, eliminate the LTL problem. The game includes mathematical analysis that assist 
in making optimized decisions in regard to utilizing capacities of the transporting vehicles leaving less empty weights 
in them. Thus, it is considered an optimal decision. 
 
Players 
 
ܤ௝: The set of all carriers assigned in the game as benefactors,  j א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ. 
௝ܱ: The set of all carriers assigned in the game as occupiers,  j א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ Ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ. 
 
Notions 
 
ܳ௝: Quantity of the products asked to be delivered by the ݆௧௛carrier. 
௜ܸ௝ : The ݅௧௛collaborative shipping vehicle that belongs to the ݆௧௛  carrier.  Where i is a finite number indicating 
vehicles’ id. 
ܦ௏೔ೕ
௝ : Delivered quantity of the products by the ݆௧௛carrier utilizing the ௜ܸ௝ shipping vehicle. 
௜ܻ ǣ Maximum weight of the ݅௧௛collaborative shipping vehicle. 
௝ܼ: Delivery cost charged by the ݆௧௛ carrier. 
ܮܶܮ௜: Less than truck load in the ݅௧௛ shipping vehicle. 
 
Assumptions 
 
1) Each carrier enter the game has exactly the same four weights of the collaborative shipping vehicles, which are 
specified as following: 11000, 9000, 7000, and 5000 kg.   
2) Occupying full truckload qualifies 8% off the total delivery cost from each fully occupied vehicle.   
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Strategies 
 
1) All carriers concern with occupying full truckloads to qualify their retailers to get minimized delivery cost, which 
represent the payoff in this game 
2) Carriers can be either benefactors (their id starts with the letter “B”) or occupiers (their id starts with the letter “O”) 
but, not both. The game decides the role that each carrier play.  
3) Two main steps are followed to reach the optimal solution: 
i. First, the set of the collaborative shipping vehicles to be released is identified.  
ii. Second, each carrier starts fulfilling his delivery demands from his released vehicles.  
4) Assign carriers whom fully satisfied their delivery demands and still have available empty weights in their shipping 
vehicles as benefactors. On the other hand, assign carriers whom their planned released vehicles have not fully 
satisfy their delivery demands as occupiers. 
 
4.1. Game Theoretic Scenario 
 
Assume that three carriers entered the game as illustrated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Carriers entered the game (input table) 
Carrier ID ሺ࢐ሻ Total Requested Quantities ሺࡽ࢐ሻ 
ͳ 17000 
ʹ 26000 
͵ 13000 
 
First step: Identify the optimal set of the collaborative shipping vehicles to release  
 
This step starts from the total requested quantities asked to be delivered by all carriers entered the game. Then, 
subtract it from the largest available vehicle weight ( ௜ܻ െ σ ܳ௝௞௝ୀଵ ) till reaching zero. Note that, if the resultant quantity 
to be delivered equals or is divisible on the available vehicles’ weights then, it will automatically occupy them. Based 
on the first assumption; there will be twelve shipping vehicles available for the coalition as illustrated in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Optimal set of released shipping vehicles (output table1) 
 Shipping Vehicles’ Weights ( ௜ܻ) Total Requested Quantities ሺܳ௝ሻ 
ଵܸଵ ൌ ͳͳͲͲͲ 56000 
ଵܸଶ ൌ ͳͳͲͲͲ 45000 
ଵܸଷ ൌ ͳͳͲͲͲ 34000 
ଶܸଵ ൌ ͻͲͲͲ 23000 
ଶܸଶ ൌ ͻͲͲͲ 14000 
ଶܸଷ ൌ ͻͲͲͲ 0 
ଷܸଵ ൌ ͹ͲͲͲ 0 
ଷܸଶ ൌ ͹ͲͲͲ 0 
ଷܸଷ ൌ ͹ͲͲͲ 0 
ସܸଵ ൌ ͷͲͲͲ 5000 
ସܸଶ ൌ ͷͲͲͲ 0 
ସܸଷ ൌ ͷͲͲͲ 0 
 
Based on the results of Table 7, we conclude that six collaborative shipping vehicles should be released, which 
are ଵܸଵ, ଵܸଶǡ ଵܸଷǡ ଶܸଵǡ ଶܸଶǡ Ƭ ସܸଵ.  
 
Second step: Satisfy carriers’ delivery orders 
 
This step fulfils each carrier delivery order utilizing his released shipping vehicles that were decided on the 
previous step. Subtract the total quantities of the products to be delivered by each carrier from the total available 
weight of all his released shipping vehicles. Based on the sign of the resulting number each carrier’s role will be 
specified in the game. If the resulted number is positive then, the carrier will be assigned as a “Benefactor”. While, 
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if the resulted number is negative then, the carrier will be assigned as an “Occupier”. Moreover, this step indicates 
the exact amount to give or to occupy. 
 
Table 8. Assigned quantities to satisfy each carrier delivery order (output table2) 
 
Carrier 
 
Released Vehicles ෍ ௜ܻ௝
ସ௞
௜ୀଵ
െܳ௝  
 
Assigned Role 
1 ଵܸଵ = 11000 
ଶܸଵ ൌ ͻͲͲͲ 
ସܸଵ ൌ ͷͲͲͲ 
25000 – 17000 = +8000 Benefactor 
2 ଵܸଶ = 11000 
ଶܸଶ ൌ ͻͲͲͲ 
20000 – 26000 = -6000 Occupier 
3 ଵܸଷ ൌ ͳͳͲͲͲ 11000 – 13000 = -2000 Occupier 
 
Based on the results of Table 8, we conclude that the first carrier is able to deliver all his requested quantities of 
the freight using his shipping vehicles. Furthermore, he has 8000 kg available empty weights in his shipping vehicles. 
Hence, he gives the empty weights to other carriers in the game. The second carrier is able to deliver only 20000 kg 
utilizing his planned shipping vehicles and he still needs to deliver 6000 kg. Thus, he will receive the needed weight 
from the benefactor’s first carrier. The Third carrier is able to deliver only 11000 kg utilizing his planned shipping 
vehicle and he still needs to deliver 2000 kg. Thus, he will receive the needed weight from the benefactor’s first carrier. 
 
Table 9. Final quantities to deliver (output table3) 
Carrier Delivered quantity (ܦ௏೔ೕ
௝ ) Total ሺσ ܦ௏೔ೕ
௝ସ௞
௜ୀଵ ሻ 
1 ܦ௏భభଵ = 11000 
ܦ௏మభଵ = 6000 
17000 
2 ܦ௏భమଶ = 11000 
ܦ௏మమଶ = 9000 
ܦ௏మభଶ = 3000 
ܦ௏రభଶ = 3000 
26000 
3 ܦ௏భయଷ = 11000 
ܦ௏రభଷ = 2000 
13000 
 
The first carrier who is requested to deliver a total of 17000 kg of the freight, delivered it on two shipments utilizing 
his first and second collaborative transporting vehicles.  The second carrier who is requested to deliver 26000 kg of 
the freight, delivered it on four shipments, utilizing his first and second transporting vehicles. Moreover, he 
collaborated with the first carrier to deliver his two remained shipments. While, the third and the last carrier who is 
requested to deliver 13000 kg of the freight, delivered it on two shipments, utilizing his first transporting vehicle and 
collaborating with the first carrier to deliver his remained quantity of the freight. Concluding that all of the released 
collaborative vehicles are fully occupied and thus, they are free of the LTL problem. 
Assuming that all of the carriers in coalition agreed on these collaboration decisions. Because it satisfies their 
delivery orders, as well as, it qualifies them to minimize the delivery cost to their retailers. We can now visualize the 
carriers’ collaboration chart as illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Fig. 3. Carriers’ collaboration chart 
 
Noticing that, all entered players have collaborated either fully or partially and that there is no loser in this scenario. 
Thus, it satisfies the “Nash Equilibrium” solution concept.  
 
4.2. Mathematical Formulation 
 
This section formulates the main objectives of the modeled game theory for carriers in coalition mathematically. 
Considering the main objectives, which are to minimize the delivery cost to retailers and to maximize the shipping 
vehicles’ utilization rate. Another implicit objective of the game is to minimize late deliveries because carriers’ 
collaboration lead eventually to expedite the freights’ dispatching and distribution process. All presented objectives 
developed using a multi-objective linear programming model that is solved using the goal algorithm. Presented model 
is similar in its development to a previous goal programming model suggested by Erdem and Göçen (2012) to solve 
the supplier evaluation and order allocation problem. The goal programming method ensures overreaching the targeted 
goals’ levels.  
 
Decision variable 
 
ܦ௏೔ೕ
௝ : Delivered quantity of the products by the ݆௧௛carrier utilizing the ௜ܸ௝ shipping vehicle. 
 
Parameters 
 
ߙ௜௝: Fixed delivery costs.݅ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡͶ݇ሽ݆ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ  
ߚ௜௝: Variable delivery costs.݅ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡͶ݇ሽ݆ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ 
ߤ௜: Maximum weight of released vehiclesǤ ݅ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡͶ݇ሽ 
ܮ௜: Late delivery rate. ݅ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡͶ݇ሽ 
 
Goals 
 
i. Minimize delivery cost  
஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕ
σ ஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕరೖ
೔సభ
כ σ ൫ߙ௜௝ ൅ ߚ௜௝൯ସ௞௜ୀଵ ൑ ܦ݈݁݅ݒ݁ݎݕܿ݋ݏݐ݃݋݈ܽǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇.                                                                    (1)         
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ii. Maximize vehicles utilization rate 
σ σ ஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕೖ
ೕసభ
రೖ
೔సభ
σ ఓ೔రೖ೔సభ
൒ ܸ݄݈݁݅ܿ݁ݏǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ and ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡͶ݇Ǥሺʹሻ          
 
Minimize late deliveries 
஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕ
σ ஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕరೖ
೔సభ
 כ σ ܮ௜ସ௞௜ୀଵ ൑ ܦ݈݁݅ݒ݁ݎݕݐ݅݉݁݃݋݈ܽǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇.                                                                                 (3)         
 
Regular constraints 
 
σ ܦ௏೔ೕ
௝ସ௞
௜ୀଵ ൒ ܳ௝݆ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ                                                                                                                           (4) 
σ σ ஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕೖ
ೕసభ
రೖ
೔సభ
σ ఓ೔రೖ೔సభ
ൌ ͳǡ ݅ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡͶ݇ሽ݆ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሽሺͷሻ        
ܦ௏೔ೕ
௝ ൒ Ͳǡ ݅ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡͶ݇ሽ݆ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ                                                                                            (6)        
 
Constraint (4) ensures satisfying the requested quantity of the freight by making sure that the delivered quantity 
through all shipments is greater than or equal the requested quantity. While, constraint (5) ensures that the total shipped 
quantities by all transporting vehicles are occupying full truckloads. Constraint (6) makes sure that the shipped 
quantity cannot be negative.  
Since the multi-objective linear programming model has three goals then, we denote each goal asܩఊ, forߛ א
ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ሽ. Overreaching a goal is represented by a positive goal deviation variableܩఊା.While, miss-reaching a goal is 
represented by a negative goal deviation variableܩఊି. 
 
Goal deviation constraints 
 
ǣ 
஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕ
σ ஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕరೖ
೔సభ
כ σ ൫ߙ௜௝ ൅ ߚ௜௝൯ସ௞௜ୀଵ െ ሺܩଵା െ ܩଵିሻ ൌ ܦ݈݁݅ݒ݁ݎݕܿ݋ݏݐ݃݋݈ܽǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇.                                            (7) 
 
ǣ 
σ σ ஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕೖ
ೕసభ
రೖ
೔సభ
σ ఓ೔రೖ೔సభ
െ ሺܩଶା െ ܩଶିሻ ൌ ܸ݄݈݁݅ܿ݁ݏݑݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ݃݋݈ܽǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ and ݅ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡͶ݇Ǥ                                   (8) 
 
ǣ 
஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕ
σ ஽ೇ೔ೕ
ೕరೖ
೔సభ
 כ σ ܮ௜ସ௞௜ୀଵ െ ሺܩଷା െ ܩଷିሻ ൌ ܦ݈݁݅ݒ݁ݎݕݐ݅݉݁݃݋݈ܽǡ ݆ ൌ ͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇.                                                           (9)         
 
Objective function 
The omnibus objective function combines all identified goals. It is developed in respect to the cost associated with 
the deviation from the targeted goals’ levels. Hence, a total deviation cost variables ܥఊାand ܥఊିߛ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ሽare 
identified. The objective function intends to minimize these encountered costs.    
 
Minimize σ ܥఊାܩఊା ൅ ܥఊିܩఊିଷఊୀଵ                                                                     (10) 
 
Numerical example 
Assume that there are three carriers in collation and recall the notations used in Table 10. 
Ͷ݇: The total number of the collaborative shipping vehicles. 
σ ௜ܻସ௞௜ୀଵ : Maximum available weight of all shipping vehicles.  
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ܳ௝: Total requested quantities of the products to be delivered by the carriers. 
௝ܼ: Total delivery cost. For simplicity purposes we assume that the shipping cost equals two dollar per each delivered 
kilogram. ௝ܼ = (ܳ௝ כ ʹ) ǡ ݆ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ 
Used ௜ܸ௝: The optimal set of the collaborative vehicles to fully satisfy carriers’ delivery orders. 
௜ܸ௝ No.: The number of the used vehicles to perform the delivery.  
ܮܶܮ௜: The final resulted empty weight in the released shipping vehicles. It is calculated by subtracting the delivered 
quantity from the maximum weight of the released vehicles: σ ୧ସ୩୧ୀଵ ൌ ሺσ Ɋ୧ସ୩୧ୀଵ െ ୨ሻ ǡ ݆ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ 
௝ܼ
כǣThe updated total delivery cost after applying the percent of discount on it. It is calculated as: 
௝ܼ
כ = ሺ ௝ܼ െ Ψܦ݅ݏܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ ௝ܼሻଶ șǡ ݆ א ሼͳǡʹǡ͵ǡ ǥ ǡ ݇ሽ 
%Dict., calculates the percent of discount that is qualified only when occupying full truckloads. It equals 0.08 for each 
fully occupied vehicle.  
Table 10. Numerical analysis for three carriers in coalition 
 
Carrier 
 
Ͷ݇ ෍ ௜ܻ
ସ௞
௜ୀଵ
 
 
ܳ௝ 
 
௝ܼ 
 
Used ௜ܸ௝ 
 
௜ܸ௝ No. 
 
ܮܶܮ௜ 
 
௝ܼ
כ 
 
% 
Dict. 
1 4 32000  17000  34000 11000, 7000 2 1000 31280 8% 
2 4 32000  26000  52000 11000, 9000, 7000 3 1000 43680 16% 
3 4 32000  13000  26000 5000, 9000 2 1000 23920 8% 
12 8 64000  43000 86000 11000, 11000, 9000, 7000, 5000 5 0 51600 40% 
13 8 64000  30000 60000 11000, 7000, 7000, 5000 4 0 40800 32% 
23 8 64000  39000 78000 11000, 9000, 7000, 7000, 5000  5 0 46800 40% 
123 12 96000  56000 112000 11000, 11000, 9000, 9000, 9000, 7000 6 0 58240 48% 
 
Analyzing generated results in Table 10; the higher encountered discount rate appeared in the grand full coalition 
between all the three carriers as 0.48. That is because the grand coalition resulted in satisfying all the requested delivery 
orders utilizing only six collaborative shipping vehicles and leaving no empty weights in them. On the other hand, 
when carriers worked separately; they released seven shipping vehicles leaving a total of 3000 kg LTL.   
Thereby, we notice that the carriers encountered the LTL problem when working individually while, the LTL 
problem was eliminated when they worked with each other’s in an efficient collaborative environment. Furthermore, 
the carriers in the collation achieved higher discounts rates than the carriers in the non-collaborative scenarios. Thus, 
carriers are highly recommend to work together and participate in coalition. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The study presented a complete decision support system that goes along with the future foreseeable performances 
of modern logistics systems. It proposes employing advanced and intelligent technologies such as the agents and the 
RFID, and integrate them all into one powerful application to facilitate a successful collaboration between the various 
logistical entities. Thereby, it satisfies customers’ expectations of delivering high quality standards.  
This study highly recommends collaboration and provides efficient strategies to achieve successful collaboration 
between various logistics entities. Stakeholders might be satisfied running their businesses separately with no 
connection with other stakeholders in the market. However, there are considerable financial benefits that stakeholders 
might not pay attention to if they did not participate in collaborative scenarios. “Transferring opportunistic dogma to 
be synergetic ethos of collaboration, succeeded majority of logistics organization” (Giannakis & Louis, 2011).  
Moreover, Lynch (2001) claims that the key to understanding collaborative logistics depends on recognizing how 
costs are distributed in logistics networks. Many scientists are promoting collaborative logistics. Tsai (2006) admits 
that efficient collaboration builds trust and strengthens communication. Building trusts is a demand in collaborative 
logistics because there is a need to share information and data between various logistical entities. Accordingly, 
building trusted relationships becomes significant.  In addition, sharing information between supply chain entities 
 
 
2
 http://math.about.com/od/percent/a/alg1perc.htm  
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enable them to take better decisions and thus, optimize the dynamic logistics work (Mei, 2004). Businesses gain 
success through collaboration. Tarabori (2011) claims that collaborative relationships lead to significant financial 
gains.  
Implementing the proposed application meets several essential advantages such as, automatism and real-time 
response, support decision making, achieve cost reduction, increase suppliers’ profits, facilitate healthier environment, 
ensure high quality standards, attain time management, and provide collaborative framework. Major contributions of 
the study stems from considering rapid future advances, which make not only the technologies and strategies 
significant but also exploiting them to provide quality and velocity in delivering to customers. 
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